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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 23, 1990, Michael McGinn was working as a brakeman for
Burlington Northern Railroad Company when he fell down the stairs of a moving
1
locomotive, injuring his back and ribs. He had tripped over the luggage strap of
his own suitcase, which he had placed on the floor of the locomotive in the
2
absence of available luggage racks. In his lawsuit against his railroad employer,
* J.D., University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2014. I would like to thank
Union Pacific attorneys Michael Johnson, Brian Plummer, and David Pickett for their guidance and support
throughout the writing process.
1. McGinn v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 102 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1996).
2. Id.
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McGinn alleged, among other things, that Burlington Northern had violated the
3
Boiler Inspection Act (BIA), a federal act that dictates safety standards for
4
locomotives used by interstate railroads. The employee claimed that the
locomotive should have had a luggage rack where he could place his suitcase, so
that the tripping hazard would not have been in the middle of the cab of the
5
locomotive. This complaint amounts to a design defect negligence claim directed
to the interior of the locomotive, yet the suit was filed against the railroad, rather
6
than the manufacturer of the locomotive.
Railroad employees injured on the job engage in a compensation process that
7
is unique to the railroad industry. As opposed to the typical no-fault workers’
compensation system, the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA) allows for a
more generous recovery, but only if the injured employee can prove negligence
8
9
on the part of the railroad. Shortly after Congress enacted the FELA in 1908, the
federal government enacted the Boiler Inspection Act in 1911 (later renamed the
10
Locomotive Inspection Act), which created the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA), and empowered the newly created commission to regulate and enact
11
standards to which all locomotives must conform.
In 1926, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the intent of
Congress in enacting the Locomotive Inspection Act was to occupy the entire
12
field of locomotives and their parts used by interstate railroads. This decision
established that any state law that concerns locomotives will be preempted by the
13
federal statutes and will not be recognized. The decision explicitly states that
the Court believed Congress intended a field preemption; the field was defined as
14
“the field of regulating locomotive equipment.” The Supreme Court has not yet

3. Id. The Boiler Inspection Act was expanded and renamed to the Locomotion Inspection Act in 1915.
Infra note 10.
4. 49 U.S.C. § 20701 (2006).
5. McGinn, 102 F.3d at 298.
6. Id. at 297–98.
7. The FELA only applies to railroad workers and seamen, as a special development to address the
particular dangers of these specific industries. Melissa Sandoval Greenidge, Getting the Train on the Right
Track: A Modern Proposal for Changes to the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 407,
408–09 (2010).
8. See id. at 410 (citing Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress Should Repeal the Federal Employer’s Liability
Act of 1908, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 81 (1992), and explaining how Congress drafted the FELA based on the
negligence principles of the time).
9. Federal Employer’s Liability Act of 1908, Pub. L. No. 100, §§ 1–8 (amended 1939) (current version at
45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (West 2006)).
10. The original act was called the Boiler Inspection Act and applied only to the boiler of the locomotive,
but in 1915 the act was extended to cover all locomotives and their parts, and renamed as the Locomotive
Inspection Act (LIA). Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 608 (1926).
11. Id. at 608–09.
12. Id. at 613.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 607, 613.
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extended this reasoning to prevent claims against the railroads, and, as it stands,
the decision only applies to protect the railcar and equipment manufacturers from
15
products liability suits. Therefore, because employee plaintiffs are currently
barred from bringing products liability claims against the manufacturers of
locomotives and parts, their lawyers have taken advantage of recent case law
suggesting that FELA plaintiffs can bring these claims against the railroads
16
themselves. Yet, the railroad’s only role in producing locomotives is that of
17
purchasing the locomotive and its parts.
Because employee plaintiffs continue to bring products liability cases
claiming defective design of a locomotive against employers, the railroads are
18
forced to litigate these claims—which are based on no fault of their own. In this
way, employees are eliminating the requirement of fault on the part of the
railroads by suing them under FELA for the design defects created by the
19
manufacturers. Plaintiffs are able to recover larger damages (as compared to
employees who receive payments under the typical, no-fault worker’s
20
compensations system) without proving negligence on the part of the railroad.
This trend of generous awards without a showing of any negligence goes against
the Congressional intent, and very cornerstone, of the FELA statutory scheme,
21
which allows for larger damages only in the case of railroad negligence. The
current state of the law, which allows for this inequitable result, has caused
uncertainty for the attorneys for both FELA plaintiffs and railroad defendants,
creating an atmosphere in which the outcome of a case is unknown and
unpredictable.
This Comment proposes that the field preemption enjoyed by the
manufacturers should be extended to products liability claims brought against the
railroad, and that any plaintiffs who are truly in need of compensation for their
22
injuries will largely be able to recover under traditional FELA principles. For
the small minority of cases in which a plaintiff has no recourse from the courts or
from his employer, this Comment proposes an appeals system by which this
15. Gilmore v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 2:09-cv-02180-KMJ-DAD, at 16 (defendant’s motion for
summary judgment denied) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
16. Infra Part III.C.
17. See McGinn v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 102 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff sued railroad
claiming there should have been luggage racks in the locomotive cab); Gilmore v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. S–
09–2180 -KMJ-DAD, 2012 WL 3205233, at *9 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 2012) (alleging that “air brake compartment
door that caused injury should have been made of fiberglass or have additional latches”); Woods v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., No. NC035695, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App., April 15, 2008) (plaintiff sued railroad alleging that handholds
on outside of railcar should have been horizontal, instead of vertical); infra Part III.D.
18. See, e.g., Grogg v. CSX Transp., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1000 (2009) (Grogg sued his railroad
employer for the alleged defective design of the engines of the locomotives he had been riding in for over
twenty years as a conductor).
19. See id. at 1006–07.
20. Greenidge, supra note 7, at 412.
21. Infra Part III.D.
22. Infra Part IV.
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plaintiff may file a grievance directly with the FRA, the federal agency that
23
approves locomotive designs. Part II discusses the historical backdrop of the
pertinent federal statutes. Part III details the two main Supreme Court decisions
that created this issue. Finally, Part IV proposes a solution to operator liability for
manufacturing defect and explores the arguments for and impact of expanding
the LIA field preemption to cover railroad employees. Part IV also explores the
option of establishing a system in which a plaintiff may present his case to the
FRA itself.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
FELA and the LIA were both enacted at the turn of the twentieth century,
when injuries of railroad employees were numerous, severe, and largely
24
uncompensated. In response to an epidemic of debilitating and traumatic
injuries, the federal government intervened and created a series of statutes that
25
brought uniformity and increased safety across the industry. While each set of
laws was enacted and passed separately, the Supreme Court of the United States
26
has noted that the LIA and its sister statute, the Safety Appliance Act (SAA),
“are substantively if not in form amendments to the Federal Employer’s Liability
27
Act.” Because the LIA did not create a private right of action within its
28
provisions, the interaction between the LIA and FELA has been somewhat
29
unpredictable, and the standards of each can be somewhat convoluted. This Part
discusses the implementation of each set of regulations, the extent to which
courts have interpreted their scope, and the ways in which they relate to each
other.
A. The Enactment of the Federal Employer’s Liability Act
Congress enacted the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA) in 1908 as an
affirmative measure to protect railroad employees from injuries suffered on the
30
job. The understood purpose of the statutory scheme was to afford a predictable
23. Infra Part IV.B.2.
24. See Greenidge, supra note 7, at 409–10 (describing the dangers associated with railroad work and that
there was no comprehensive federal liability system to compensate workers for their injuries).
25. Brief for Respondent at 4–5, Kurns v. R.R. Friction Products Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012) (No. 10879), 2011 WL 4590847 (citing Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 486 (1943)).
26. The Safety Appliance Act is the sister act to the Locomotive Inspection Act. While the LIA pertains
to locomotives, the SAA focuses on safety rules for the entirety of the train and its parts. See Urie v. Thompson,
337 U.S. 163, 189 (1949) (discussing the nature of the SAA and the LIA to each other, and to the FELA in
general).
27. Id.
28. See 49 U.S.C. § 20701 (2006) (failing to provide a private right).
29. Infra Part II.A.
30. Greenidge, supra note 7, at 410.
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and generous recovery for those who suffer workplace injuries while acting in
31
their capacity as railroad employees. The FELA was enacted prior to the
development of any workers’ compensation system and, in fact, differs
32
substantially from workers’ compensation systems. While most workers’
compensation programs offer a no-fault scheme where a worker will recover
33
modest damages without having to show employer fault, the FELA requires that
34
the employee prove negligence on the part of the railroad in order to recover.
Once a plaintiff proves negligence, however, the available recovery is much
larger, and the railroad employer is liable for all damages resulting from the
35
injury. This includes, but is not limited to, costs of medical care, lost future
earnings, and pain and suffering—rather than simply compensating lost wages as
36
other workers’ compensation systems do.
The text of the FELA reads that the railroads will be liable “for such injury or
death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
37
agents, or employees of such carrier.” As the Supreme Court noted in CSX
Transp., Inc. v. McBride, FELA liability is only limited in two respects: railroad
liability under the FELA extends only to employees, and employees may only
38
recover if they were injured while acting within the scope of their employment.
Outside of these two limitations, the language of the FELA is framed as broadly
39
as possible.
To prove negligence in a FELA case, plaintiffs must show the same elements
as in a common law tort case for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and
40
damages. However, a private cause of action under the FELA has a much lower
41
standard of causation than a common law negligence claim. Because of the
broad language used in drafting the FELA, the Supreme Court has held that if a
plaintiff can show even a de minimis level of causation between the railroad’s

31. Gilmore v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. S–09–2180-KMJ-DAD, 2012 WL 3205233, at *9 (E.D.Cal.
Aug. 2012) (“It makes little sense to find that a statute that serves as an amendment to the FELA, making it
easier in some cases for injured workers to pursue their claims, also restricts the kind of claims workers can
bring, particularly in light of the ‘humanitarian’ purpose of both statutes.”) (citing Urie, 337 U.S. at 188)
(defendant’s motion for summary judgment denied) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
32. Greenidge, supra note 7, at 409–10.
33. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, OBTAINING WORKER’S
COMPENSATION INSURANCE (2012), http://business.ca.gov/StartaBusiness/AdministeringEmployees/Workers
Compensation.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
34. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
35. Greenidge, supra note 7, at 430.
36. Id.; see also 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006) (stating that railroad employers will be liable in damages to
injured employees, rather than just for lost wages).
37. Id.
38. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 2636 (2011).
39. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181 (1949).
40. Hudson v. Old Guard Ins. Co., 3 A.3d 246, 250 (2010).
41. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957); see also Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695,
700 (5th Cir. 1995) (showing the common law negligence standard).
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42

negligence and his injury then the causation element will be satisfied. This is in
contrast to the typical standard for a tort claim of negligence, which requires that
the defendant’s conduct be the “but for” cause of or a substantial factor in the
43
injury. If an injured plaintiff can show all of the elements of negligence with the
lowered standard of causation, he will be able to recover for all proven damages
44
that resulted from his injury. These damages are usually substantially more
45
generous than those awarded under a no-fault workers’ compensation system.
B. History of the Locomotive Inspection Act
The Boiler Inspection Act (BIA) was passed in 1911, just three years after
46
FELA went into effect. Initially, the BIA statutory scheme applied only to the
boiler of the locomotives used by interstate railroads, but by 1915 it was renamed
the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) and “extended . . . to include the entire
47
locomotive and tender and all parts and appurtenances thereof.” The BIA has
two principal parts, which act together to achieve its dual goals of increasing
48
locomotive safety and federal uniformity of safety regulations throughout the
49
railroad industry. The main benefit of the Act was to create a uniform set of
locomotive safety standards, as there were numerous state safety standards
50
throughout the country. As will be noted below, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that states may not enact statutes requiring locomotives to carry
51
devices that conflict with, or are not required under, the LIA statutes.
The first principal part of the Act is the imposition of an absolute duty of care
on the railroads to ensure that all locomotives be inspected and maintained in

42. Id. In one case, an employee plaintiff sued his employer, alleging that the railroad was legally
responsible for a hand injury that resulted from controlling the switch for a locomotive whose engine was
different than the regular set up. In finding the standard of causation to be satisfied, the court reaffirmed the
Rogers decision and stated that “[t]o discard or restrict the Rogers instruction now would ill serve the goals of
‘stability’ and ‘predictability’. . .” of the FELA and stare decisis. CSX Transp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2641 (relying
heavily on Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506).
43. Hiltgen, 47 F.3d at 700 (5th Cir. 1995).
44. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
45. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 33; Greenidge, supra
note 7, at 430.
46. Brief for Respondent at 4, Kurns v. R.R. Friction Products Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012) (No. 10879), 2011 WL 4590847.
47. Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1926).
48. Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 486 (1943).
49. The LIA was necessary to avoid “the paralyzing effect on railroads from prescription by each state of
the safety devices obligatory on locomotives that would pass through many of them.” Swift & Co. v. Wickham,
230 F. Supp. 398, 407–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
50. See generally Napier, 272 U.S. at 605 (offering examples of the differing state regulations by which
railroads had to attempt to abide by to avoid legal action).
51. Infra Part III.A; see generally id. (the issue arose for the defendants when they chose to follow the
federal regulations issued by the FRA under the LIA, and in doing so violated conflicting state statutes).
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accordance with federal safety regulations. A violation of this duty would give
rise to a cause of action against the railroad under negligence principles, while
53
nonemployees would have to bring a claim under common law negligence.
Secondly, the LIA called for the creation of the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), which was empowered to issue safety regulations under
the LIA and to approve or deny design proposals submitted by locomotive
54
manufacturers. Because the LIA did not include a provision authorizing a
private right of action, the Supreme Court has opined that the LIA is, practically
55
speaking, an amendment to the FELA. Consequently, courts cannot discuss or
apply the LIA without acknowledging that its origins are inextricably tied to the
56
FELA. As a result, when read together the FELA and the LIA create a second
cause of action.
The LIA has imposed another standard on the railroads by which they must
57
abide. Because the LIA sets a standard of care for the railroads, the plaintiff will
58
win his case if he proves that the railroad has violated the LIA. This is because a
59
violation of the LIA constitutes negligence per se.
The LIA imposes liability for railroad carriers in two instances. The first way
a plaintiff may allege an LIA violation is to claim that the railroad has violated
60
one of the specific regulations issued by the FRA. For example, if the FRA has
issued a regulation that all brake levers must be on the conductor’s left side, but
the railroad alters the design and moves them to the conductor’s right side, then
the railroad will have violated a specific FRA regulation. The second way a
plaintiff may prove a violation of the LIA is to show that the railroad has violated
its “broad duty to keep all parts and appurtenances of its locomotives in proper
61
condition and safe to operate without necessary peril to life or limb.” A
violation of this kind would consist of a general failure to maintain or care for the
62
locomotives. This Article deals primarily with this second type of violation,
which can only be brought by a railroad employee (as defined in the FELA

52. 49 U.S.C. § 20701 (2006).
53. McGinn, 102 F.3d at 299 (a nonemployee must bring the claim under common law, while the
employee may bring the claim under either common law or the FELA—which is more generous than the
common law because of the lowered causation standard).
54. Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 608 (1926).
55. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 189 (1949).
56. Id.
57. 49 U.S.C. § 20702 (2006).
58. Id.; McGinn, 102 F.3d at 299.
59. Urie, 337 U.S. at 189. It is clear that the LIA “dispense[s], for the purposes of employee’s suits, with
the necessity of proving that violations of the safety statutes constitute negligence; and making proof of such
violations is effective to show negligence as a matter of law.” Id.
60. McGinn, 102 F.3d at 299.
61. Id.
62. 49 U.S.C. § 20702 (2006).
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provisions ). It is this type of violation that allows an employee to recover
64
extensive damages without proving railroad negligence.
First, an employee plaintiff files a claim under the FELA, alleging an LIA
violation. To meet his burden, the plaintiff must prove there was a violation of an
FRA regulation. If the plaintiff successfully demonstrates such a violation, he can
65
recover proven damages. The railroad does not have the option of offering a
defense to the statutory violation; once the violation is proven, the only step left
66
is to calculate damages. Taken together, the FELA and the LIA seek to ensure
that railroad workers who are injured or killed on the job are fully
compensated—without forcing railroad employers to completely insure their
67
employees.
III. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW: THE NAPIER AND KURNS
DECISIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Prior to 1926, although the LIA had been enacted, there was no uniform case
law on how the federal railroad workers’ compensation scheme was supposed to
interact with the various state statutes and regulations that existed across the
68
country. Two key decisions from the Supreme Court have created the national
climate in which railroad employees who allege a defective design of
69
locomotives are suing railroad employers. The first case, Napier v. Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad Company, which was decided in 1926, dealt with state laws
70
that conflicted with LIA regulations. After eighty-six years of silence, the
Supreme Court spoke on the issue again in 2012 when it decided Kurns v.
Railroad Friction Products Corporation. This time the Court dealt with a state
71
common law claim that was alleged to be outside the reach of the LIA. The
discussion will begin with a brief overview of preemption concepts, so as to
better understand the preemption implications in the Napier and Kurns cases.

63. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
64. Greenidge, supra note 7, at 430.
65. Urie, 337 U.S. at 189.
66. Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 485 (1943).
67. See Gardner v. CSX Transp., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 473, 483 (W. Va. 1997) (finding for the defendant, the
court emphasized that the FELA was to be liberal, but was not to be a no-fault system—plaintiffs must always
prove negligence on the part of the railroad).
68. See generally Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) (analyzing the scope of the
LIA, and interpreting its reach and intent for the first time).
69. Interview with Michael Johnson, Senior Trial Counsel, Union Pacific Railroad Company, in
Roseville, CA (Sept. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Johnson Interview] (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
70. Napier, 272 U.S. at 606–07.
71. Kurns v. R.R. Friction Products Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1261 (2012).
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A. Field Preemption: The Basics
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution states that federal
72
laws “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” This clause is universally
accepted to mean that in the event of a conflict between federal and state law, the
federal law will be controlling and the state law will be rendered invalid to the
73
extent that it conflicts. Generally, preemption analyses are primarily questions
of Congressional intent, and a court will look to see that Congress intended for a
74
federal law to override state laws.
Further, if Congress shows intent to regulate the entire field, but there is no
express preemption language, the courts may find that implied field preemption
75
applies. Field preemption can often be found where the “federal interest [in a
field] is so dominant, that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
76
enforcement of the state laws on the same subject.” In the following discussion
of the Napier case, it is clear that the Supreme Court set out to analyze the scope
of the LIA in the absence of any express preemption language to determine if
there was a place for any state statutes in the field of locomotive safety
77
standards.
B. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company
The first case in which the Supreme Court analyzed the scope and reach of
the LIA was a consolidation of three cases that asked the same basic question:
“whether the [LIA] has occupied the field of regulating locomotive equipment
78
used on a highway of interstate commerce, so as to preclude state legislation.”
Each of the three cases involved a state statute, of which there was an alleged
79
violation. The defendant railroad companies in all three cases wanted to “enjoin
state officials from enforcing” the state statutes, claiming that they were invalid
80
and in conflict with the newly established LIA.
In Napier, the railroads challenged state laws that allowed locomotives to
cross into the specified state only if they were outfitted with certain prescribed
81
devices. Specifically, a statute enacted in Georgia required a particular type of

72. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
73. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
77. Napier, 272 U.S. at 607.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Kurns v. R.R. Friction Products Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261,1266 (2012) (discussing the Napier case
as prior precedence).
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82

automatic fire box door, while a statute from Wisconsin required each
locomotive to be equipped with a cab curtain, which would protect engineers and
83
firemen from seasonal weather. Neither of these devices was required under the
LIA. The railroads challenged the states’ power to enact laws relating to
84
locomotive safety.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that field preemption applied by
implication over the entire field of locomotive safety regulations and
85
requirements. It was irrelevant that the FRA had not issued any particular
regulations on these specific devices; what mattered was that the FRA had the
86
sole power to do so. The Supreme Court stated that “[t]he fact that the
Commission [FRA] has not seen fit to exercise its authority to the full extent
conferred, has no bearing upon the construction of the act delegating the
87
power.”
As the law stands today, no state may regulate locomotive equipment,
88
whether or not the FRA has spoken on the issue. The policy behind this decision
is a strong need for federal uniformity in laws so that interstate railroads do not
89
have to abide by different laws in each state they pass through. Requiring a
business to change the devices and safety equipment on a locomotive at each
state line would have a severe impact on economic efficiency and interstate
90
commerce. The Supreme Court’s decision in Napier was limited to the holding
that states may not pass independent laws governing the design, construction, and
91
safety equipment of locomotives, and did not even mention the area of products
liability. Nevertheless, this case was instrumental in laying the foundation for a
much later case in which the Supreme Court would clarify the scope of the LIA
92
field preemption in the area of products liability.

82. A fire box door is a door that covers the area where the fuel is burned on a locomotive, the purpose of
which is to protect the firemen from the heat and flames. Napier, 272 U.S. at 609.
83. Id. at 609–10.
84. Id. at 609.
85. Id. at 612–13.
86. Id. at 613.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See generally Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (focusing on the
Dormant Commerce Clause and effects on interstate commerce, the Supreme Court held that requiring an
interstate carrier to abide by different safety regulations in different states places an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce).
90. Id.
91. Napier, 272 U.S. at 613.
92. Kurns v. R.R. Friction Products Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1266 (2012).
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C. Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corporation
93

George Corson was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma in 2005, after
working for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad for almost
94
thirty years. Following his diagnosis, he and his wife, Freida E. Jung Corson,
95
filed a lawsuit in 2007 against several manufacturers of locomotive parts. After
Corson succumbed to the cancerous tumor, Gloria Kurns, the executrix of his
96
estate, was substituted as a party. The complaint alleged state common law
claims of defective design and inadequate warnings, directed at Railroad Friction
Products Corporation (RFPC) (a manufacturer of locomotive brakeshoes) and
Viad Corporation (a manufacturer of locomotives and locomotive engine
97
valves). The plaintiffs primarily alleged that the products contained asbestos,
and that the manufacturers should be held liable for defectively designing the
products and marketing them to consumers without adequate warnings of the
98
possibility of asbestos.
The Kurns case presented a novel question because, in contrast to Napier, the
cause of action was a state common law claim, rather than a private right of
99
action arising from a statute violation. Despite the plaintiffs’ efforts to
distinguish this case from Napier, the Court did not see a distinction and
100
reinforced the field preemption held by the Supreme Court in 1926. The Court
went on to extend the scope of the field regulated by the LIA, holding that in
addition to preempting state statutes, the act would preempt claims of state
101
common law, including a design defect cause of action.
Of interest is the fact that four of the nine Supreme Court justices concurred
with the majority opinion and agreed that the Napier field preemption blocked
petitioners’ claims, but stated that they believed the Court would decide the
102
Napier case differently today. Under the Court’s more recent decisions
regarding field preemption, the Court held that “Congress must do much more to
103
oust all of state law from a field,” such as expressly state that field preemption
exists or state the congressional intent behind the act with such strength and
93. This diagnosis is defined as “an uncommon cancerous tumor of the lining of the lung and chest cavity
(pleura) or lining of the abdomen (peritoneum) that is typically due to long-term asbestos exposure.” A.D.A.M.
Medical Encyclopedia, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE (June 5, 2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmedhealth/PMH0001174/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
94. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1264.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1265.
97. Id. at 1264.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1270.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1270–72 (Kagan, J. concurring).
103. Id. at 1270 (Kagan, J. concurring).
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104

clarity that it becomes obvious field preemption was intended. However,
because Congress had not exhibited any desire to remove or lessen the impact of
the Napier decision, the Court ultimately applied stare decisis and agreed the
105
application of Napier would preclude plaintiffs’ claims.
106
The Kurns decision has caused some turmoil in the railroad industry.
Because of the eighty-six-year hiatus between Supreme Court decisions ruling on
the LIA field preemption, many of the immediate consequences of the Napier
107
decision had become settled. The Kurns decision disturbed this settled area of
law, leaving FELA plaintiffs and railroad employers equally unsure of what the
108
law actually is.
D. The Practical Effect of Napier and Kurns
Although not expressly limited to manufacturers, the practical effect of both
the Napier and Kurns cases has been that the manufacturers of locomotives and
109
locomotive parts cannot be sued for a design the FRA approved. The combined
holdings mean a plaintiff cannot sue the manufacturer under state codified law
110
that includes a private right of action (Napier) or under state common law
111
(Kurns). Because these are the only two ways to bring a case, if a
manufacturer’s design of a locomotive or its parts receives approval from the
112
FRA, then a plaintiff cannot file a lawsuit challenging that design. As long as
manufacturers design their products in accordance with the regulations issued by
the FRA, a plaintiff who is injured by a locomotive or its parts will not be able to
113
bring a suit alleging that the design was defective in any way. Because
plaintiffs cannot sue the manufacturers, many are now suing the railroads
114
instead.

104. See id. at 1270 (Kagan, J. concurring) (citing N. Y. State Dept. of Soc. Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405, 415 (1973), in which the Supreme Court rejected field preemption, even though the regulatory scheme
passed by Congress was “detailed” and “comprehensive,” much like the LIA).
105. Id. at 1269–70.
106. Johnson Interview, supra note 69.
107. Id.
108. Id. Senior Trial Counsel for Union Pacific Railroad, Michael Johnson, explains the impact of this
decision on attorneys: railroad lawyers for both plaintiffs and defendants felt that their legal world was
predictable and manageable. With the Kurns decision extending the field preemption to block state common law
claims, a level of uncertainty has emerged among the attorneys who litigate these types of lawsuits as to
whether or not a court will allow them to proceed or find them to be preempted by the Napier field preemption.
Id.
109. Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926); Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1269–70.
110. Napier, 272 U.S. at 613.
111. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1269–70.
112. See generally id. (holding that in addition to state statutes and regulations, all state common law
claims that conflict with the provisions of the LIA are preempted by the Napier decision).
113. Napier, 272 U.S. at 613; Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1269–70.
114. See, e.g,. Gilmore v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. S–09–2180-KMJ-DAD, 2012 WL 3205233, at *9
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The limitations outlined in Kurns apply to the railroads as well, so that
115
nonemployees cannot sue the railroads for a supposed defective design.
116
However, Kurns does not apply to employees. Because of the FELA,
employees have an extremely protective and liberal set of statutes under which
117
they can sue their railroad employers for an injury sustained on the job.
E. Recovery for Injury
For an employee bringing a claim against a railroad, there are three primary
ways to frame a case. The first way is to bring a typical claim of negligence
118
under the FELA. The element of duty is always going to be satisfied, unless
there is a question of whether or not the claimant is a hired contractor rather than
119
an actual employee. Because the standard of causation is lowered, and the
120
smallest link will satisfy it, the plaintiff’s biggest challenge will be proving a
121
breach of the standard of care.
The second way plaintiffs can recover for an injury suffered on the job is by
122
123
claiming a violation of the SAA or the LIA. If an employee can prove that
either a railcar or locomotive, or any of its parts, were not maintained according
124
to the federal standards, then the plaintiff’s burden will be satisfied. A proven
violation is negligence per se, and the railroad has no opportunity to offer a

(E.D.Cal. Aug. 2012) (plaintiff sued railroad, claiming that air brake compartment doors should be made of
fiberglass, or have additional latches, where the LIA did not require such devices or materials) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
115. See Napier, 272 U.S. at 613; Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1269–70 (court did not limit these decisions to just
manufacturers, the opinions are general and applicable to all defendants).
116. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1269–70.
117. See Greenidge, supra note 7, at 408 (discussing that the purpose of the FELA was to put employees
on equal footing with their employers, and to facilitate recovery for workplace injuries).
118. See id. at 410 (citing Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress Should Repeal the Federal Employer’s
Liability Act of 1908, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 82 (1992) and explaining that the FELA was enacted based on
negligence principles at the time) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
119. The special relationship of employer-employee is enough to prove that the defendant owed a duty to
the plaintiff. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2012) (describing what an employee is for purposes of the FELA).
120. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957); Vaillancourt v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.,
791 F. Supp. 734, 738 (1992).
121. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506.
122. The SAA is another regulatory scheme that preceded the FELA and the LIA, was passed by
Congress in 1893, and outlined general safety requirements for the entire train. It was the first time that
Congress codified the duty of safety that railroads had to abide by. Shields v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 350 U.S.
318, 320 (1956). The legal problems discussed in this Article are equally applicable to problems arising under
the SAA and will be discussed throughout.
123. McGinn v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 102 F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1996).
124. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 189 (1949).
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125

defense. Once a FELA plaintiff proves a violation of the federal statute, the
126
only remaining step is to calculate the damages owed to the plaintiff.
These first two options require proving fault on the part of the railroad; the
first requires proving all of the elements of negligence, while the second requires
showing a violation of safety regulations that the railroad is required to abide by.
These types of suits require the plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the
127
railroad, as negligence is the fundamental element required by the FELA. This
is in contrast to the third way that a plaintiff may bring a case, where the
complaint does not allege 1) negligence on the part of the railroad employer or 2)
128
legally unsafe modifications to the locomotive made by the railroad.
The third way a plaintiff may bring a claim is in the form of a products
129
liability claim under the FELA, alleging a defective design of the locomotive.
This type of claim is brought when the cause of the injury is not due to
negligence on the part of the railroad or failure to maintain equipment up to
130
federal standards. This strategy does not allege fault directly on the part of the
railroad, but constitutes a products liability suit alleging that the locomotive or
131
rail car itself is defectively designed. Because, as noted in previous sections,
132
the manufacturers are exempt from these types of claims, the employees are
133
filing them against the railroads. These suits are being brought against the
railroads despite the fact that the railroads are typically not involved in the chain
134
of production.
In typical products liability cases, a plaintiff can sue all members in the chain
135
of production, including the manufacturer and retailer. The railroads are
generally outside of the recognized chain of production because in these types of
cases the railroad did not design or sell the locomotive. The railroad’s only role
was that of consumer—which is the party that would normally bring the products
liability claim rather than defend against it. By bringing these suits, injured
125. Id.
126. Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 485 (1943) (a violation of the regulations set out by
the FRA gives right to a suit for damages).
127. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
128. See, e.g., McGinn, 102 F.3d at 297 (plaintiff brought a claim alleging only that the design of the
locomotive was defective, not that there was any negligence on the part of the railroad).
129. Id.
130. See id. (plaintiffs sole claim was that the manufacturers should have installed luggage racks in the
cab of the locomotive, which was contrary to the FRA regulations).
131. See McGinn, 102 F.3d at 297 (plaintiff brought a claim alleging only that the design of the
locomotive was defective, not that there was any negligence on the part of the railroad).
132. Supra Part II.A; Kurns v. R.R. Friction Products Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1270 (2012).
133. Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926); Kurns, 132 S.Ct. at 1270 (both cases
holding that the LIA constituted field preemption against conflicting state common law and regulations).
134. Napier, 272 U.S. at 613; Kurns, 132 S.Ct. at 1270.
135. See generally Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that sellers
as well as manufacturers can be liable for a defect in a product, based on a theory that the seller should have
detected the theory and should share in the blame if an injury results).
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employees are seeking to recover from the railroad for an injury that is not due to
136
fault on the part of the railroad. As a result, FELA plaintiffs find themselves
better situated than injured employees of other industries: they are able to recover
the larger damages that are available without showing fault on the part of their
137
employers.
FELA plaintiffs may rely on a theory of agency law in order to overcome the
argument that railroad employers are not in the chain of production and should
138
not be able to be sued for products liability. Under agency theories, the
principal has a duty to furnish the agent with information regarding potential
139
dangers or harm that is within the scope of the agency relationship. The
determination of whether something has a level of danger sufficient to trigger this
140
duty is a fact specific inquiry. It is likely that this will be enough to allow a
court to find a triable issue of fact to overcome summary judgment. From there,
141
the decision of liability would be in the hands of the jury, a group which is
142
generally very unsympathetic to railroad corporations.
143
Because a plaintiff must be an employee under the FELA, and an
employer-employee relationship is generally understood to constitute a principal144
agent relationship, agency law would apply to a FELA plaintiff. Using these
laws, FELA plaintiffs would be able to show that, as agents of the railroad, they
145
must be furnished with equipment that is safe and warned of potential dangers.
While it has not yet become apparent that plaintiffs are using these theories in
order to forward their claims, this type of argument would likely be enough to
allow a case to proceed on a products liability theory. The existence of these
agency principles also makes it clear that a railroad will not be able to dispense
of these lawsuits merely by comparing itself to consumers in other products
liability cases.

136. Gilmore v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. S–09–2180-KMJ-DAD, 2012 WL 3205233, at *9 (E.D.Cal.
Aug. 2012) (plaintiff sued railroad, claiming that air brake compartment doors should be made of fiberglass, or
have additional latches, where the LIA did not require such devices or materials) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
137. See Gilmore, 2012 WL 3205233, at *9; Woods v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. NC035695, at *7 (Cal.
Ct. App., Apr. 15, 2008) (plaintiffs filed lawsuits that did not allege railroad negligence and yet they sought the
larger damages that are available to FELA plaintiffs) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
138. Supra Part II.A.
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.15 (2006).
140. Id.
141. Or judge, in the case of a bench trial.
142. Johnson Interview, supra note 69.
143. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
144. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, comm G (2006) (the Restatement assumes that all
employees are agents by stating that “[a]s agents, all employees owe duties of loyalty to their employers”).
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.15 (2006).
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IV. EXTENDING NAPIER’S FIELD PREEMPTION TO RAILROAD CARRIERS
Courts are conflicted as to whether the field preemption established in Napier
146
should be extended to protect the railroad carriers themselves. While courts
may make the logical extension and disallow an employee lawsuit alleging
147
design defects against a railroad, a minority will allow these suits to survive a
148
motion to dismiss and go to trial. This lack of consistency has caused
uncertainty among lawyers attempting to bring or defend against these types of
149
products liability claims. While some courts are dismissing lawsuits at the
150
151
summary judgment stage and some are allowing the cases to continue to trial,
all parties involved in this type of litigation proceed with caution, unsure of how
152
the case will unfold. With such an unpredictable future, attorneys cannot even
153
determine the value of a case or agree on a settlement. Additionally, to survive
summary judgment, some plaintiffs’ attorneys attempt to create a triable issue of
154
fact over whether the device in question is covered by the LIA.
In a profession that values predictability in order to be most effective, this
uncertainty leads attorneys and clients to settle cases more quickly out of fear of
155
the unknown. In order to create a level of certainty in the industry and bring a

146. Garza v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 3:09-cv-2045, 2012 WL 3758632 (N.D. Ohio, July 23, 2012)
(extending preemption); Gilmore v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. S–09–2180-KMJ-DAD, 2012 WL 3205233, at *9
(E.D.Cal. Aug. 2012) (refusing to extend preemption).
147. See, e.g., Garza, No. 3:09-cv-2045, 2012 WL 3758632 (N.D. Ohio, July 23, 2012) (holding that, in
the absence of any evidence showing a violation of FRA regulations or negligent maintenance of the
locomotive, the plaintiff’s defective design claims were preempted by Napier).
148. “[D]espite many cases in many districts and circuits throughout the country, the degree to which
[LIA] preclusion applies to FELA claims remains a developing part of the law and there is clearly no bright line
test for applying preclusion. Preclusion analysis must still be done on a case by case, claim by claim basis.”
Grogg v. CSX Transp., Inc., 659 F.Supp.2d 998, 1011 (2009); see also Gilmore, 2012 WL 3205233, at *9
(holding “that preemption of state laws d[oes] not necessarily mean that an action based on another federal
statute [is] necessarily precluded”); Woods v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. NC035695, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App., Apr.
15, 2008) (court denied motion for summary judgment and allowed case to go to trial, where the judge directed
a verdict for the railroad, citing plaintiff’s failure to meet its burden of proof).
149. Johnson Interview, supra note 69.
150. Garza, No. 3:09-cv-2045, 2012 WL 3758632 (N.D. Ohio, July 23, 2012).
151. Woods, No. NC035695 (Cal. Ct. App., April 15, 2008) (case was heard in the California Court of
Appeal for the Second District after a jury trial); Grogg, 659 F.Supp.2d at 1014 (“[T]his court refuses to extend
the preclusion doctrine . . . to the present case as CSX urges it to do . . . the court concludes that the LIA does
not preclude Grogg’s claims under the FELA and CSX’s motion for summary judgment . . . is denied.”).
152. Johnson Interview, supra note 69.
153. Id.
154. There is a small line of case law that suggests that the LIA does not encompass all parts on a
locomotive, but only those that are deemed “essential” are covered. Therefore, the theory is that showing that a
device was not integral part of a locomotive will relieve the plaintiff of the burden of the LIA field preemption.
Grogg, 659 F.Supp.2d at 1013 (2009) (citing Southern Ry. Co. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398, 402 (1936)).
155. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. S–09–2180-KMJ-DAD, , 2012 WL 3205233, at *9
(E. Dist. Aug. 2012) (case settled after defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).

754

04_DIEL_V1_1-13-14-3_FINAL_04.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/10/2014 10:58 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 45
level of fairness to FELA plaintiffs and railroad employers, as compared to the
workers’ compensation systems of other industries, Congress should clarify its
intent and enact a final rule of law that makes it clear to all parties that the Napier
field preemption extends to railroads. Consequently, plaintiffs will not be able to
bring a case alleging defective design without any evidence of an actual violation
of the LIA, despite plaintiffs’ argument that this would violate the liberal and
156
humanitarian nature of the FELA and the LIA.
A. Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Expansion of Field Preemption
Railroad employees and their attorneys have advocated that field preemption
157
should not be extended to protect the railroads from these types of lawsuits.
While attorneys are not arguing that a regular civilian should be able to bring suit
against the railroad, plaintiffs argue that the FELA creates a special set of
circumstances under which an injured employee can sue the railroad employer
alleging only that the locomotive where the injury occurred was defectively
designed, without needing to show an actual violation of FRA regulations or
158
negligent maintenance.
The strongest argument in support of allowing these types of lawsuits rests
with Congress’ intent for enacting the FELA. The need for the FELA arose in
response to a growing number of devastating railroad accidents, in which more
159
and more employees were being killed or maimed. At the time it was passed,
the Act was exceedingly progressive as compared to statutes pertaining to
employees of other industries; and it was to be liberally construed so as to align
with Congressional intent and to allow employees to be on equal footing with
160
their employers in a lawsuit resulting from injury.
161
Although based on negligence principles, the FELA abolished the common
162
163
law doctrines of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence, so that
156. Infra Part IV.A; Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987) (citing
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949)).
157. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Kurns v. R.R. Friction Products Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012) (No. 10879), 2011 WL 5126230.
158. See, e.g., Garza v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 3:09-cv-2045, 2012 WL 3758632 (N.D. Ohio, July 23,
2012) (plaintiff alleged that the cab design was defective and prevented him from slowing the train effectively
and sued his railroad employer for his resulting injury).
159. Greenidge, supra note 7, at 410.
160. Bluell, 480 U.S. at 562 (citing Urie, 337 U.S. at 180).
161. Greenidge, supra note 7, at 410.
162. Assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense in which a defendant will attempt to show that a
plaintiff assumed the risk of a particular activity. In the FELA context, it is used to say that an injured party
assumed the risks of the job by accepting a position. Greenidge, supra note 7, at 406 (citing Thomas Tidd &
Daniel Saphire, The Case for Repeal of the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, (Washington Legal Foundation,
Critical Legal Issues, Working Papers Series, Paper No. 23, 1988)).
163. Contributory negligence is also an affirmative defense, and is defined as “conduct on the part of the
plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection.” At the time the
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railroads could not avoid paying damages by claiming the employee contributed
to the accident or agreed to assume the risk merely by accepting a job at the
164
railroad. In addition to removing two of the railroad’s affirmative defenses,
courts have interpreted the FELA as requiring a relaxed standard of causation, so
that a plaintiff needs only show “that employer negligence played any part, even
165
the slightest, in producing the injury.” By creating these relaxed causation
principles, Congress has shown a preference for and has helped facilitate
employee recovery, as it is now “well established that the quantum of evidence
required to establish liability in a FELA case is much less than in an ordinary
166
negligence action.” While it does not approach the level of strict liability, the
167
standard of care can be described as one of easy negligence.
Because of the FELA’s plaintiff-friendly provisions and the clear
congressional intent to help injured employees recover from their employers,
advocates of allowing these lawsuits argue that it would be fundamentally unfair
168
and counterintuitive to protect the railroads. The intent of the Act was clearly to
protect workers engaged in a dangerous industry; thus, allowing railroads to hide
behind the Napier field preemption would frustrate that purpose by denying
169
plaintiffs one avenue of recovery. Additionally, proponents point out that the
FELA and the LIA are meant to be “‘remedial and humanitarian’ statutes that
impose two separate types of liability to protect the safety of railroad
170
employees.” It would be nonsensical to extend the Napier field preemption to
cover railroads, when doing so would make it more difficult for an employee to
171
recover.
An additional argument utilized by plaintiffs is that the LIA has been
interpreted so that the term “parts and appurtenances” does not include all parts
FELA was enacted, proving of contributory negligence would eliminate a plaintiff’s ability to recover damages.
Murray v. N.Y, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 255 F.2d 42, 44 (2nd Cir. 1958).
164. Greenidge, supra note 7, at 410 (citing Thomas Tidd & Daniel Saphire, The Case for Repeal of the
Federal Employer’s Liability Act, (Washington Legal Foundation, Critical Legal Issues, Working Papers Series,
Paper No. 23, 1988)).
165. Harbin v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Rogers v. Missouri
Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (emphasis in original)).
166. Id.
167. See Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506 (emphasizing the lowered standard of causation for FELA cases, and
discussing the intent that plaintiffs recover more easily than they would under ordinary negligence).
168. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Preempted Worker Protection, Supreme Court Review 48-JUL
Trial 52 (July 2012) (expressing disapproval at the Kurns decision, and arguing that injured employees and their
families should be able to sue and recover for injuries from defectively designed locomotives and parts) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
169. Id.
170. Matson v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 1233, 1235 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing King v. Pac.
Transp. Co., 855 F.2d 1485, 1488 n.1 (10th Cir. 1988).
171. See Gilmore v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. S–09–2180-KMJ-DAD, 2012 WL 3205233, at *10 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (“[R]ejecting the argument . . . that the preemption of state laws did not necessarily mean
that an action based on another federal statute was necessarily precluded. . . .”) (motion for summary judgment
denied).
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172

that could conceivably be attached to a locomotive. The Supreme Court has
stated that “mere experimental devices which do not increase the peril, but may
173
prove helpful in an emergency, are not [within the LIA].” The Court went on to
define “parts and appurtenances” as “[w]hatever in fact is an integral or essential
part of a completed locomotive, and all parts or attachments definitely prescribed
174
by lawful order . . . .” Because of this decision, plaintiffs’ attorneys can attempt
to expand the category of a nonessential device, so that the LIA will not apply to
the case. If the LIA does not apply, then neither will the field preemption, and an
employee plaintiff will be able to bring a design defect claim and recover the
larger damages. For the same reasons identified below, expansion of this
definition is not a viable option for courts to take because it will result in lack of
175
uniformity among statutes regarding locomotive parts.
FELA plaintiffs argue that limiting what types of claims an injured employee
can bring against his employer is in stark contrast to the purpose of the FELA
176
and the LIA, which is to be humanitarian and liberally construed to the benefit
177
of the employee. Therefore, plaintiffs and their attorneys argue that it is unjust
to limit the rights of FELA claimants. That is, in order to further the progressive
nature of federal railroad legislation, plaintiffs should be able to sue railroads for
178
defectively designed locomotives or locomotive parts.
Although these
arguments may seem to carry some weight, they are outweighed by the
overwhelming arguments opposing these kinds of lawsuits.
B. Derailing the Arguments Against Field Preemption Expansion
Despite the congressional goals of the FELA and the LIA, it is illogical to
hold the railroads legally responsible for the actions of an entirely different
entity. In most cases, the railroad carrier is a wholly independent company from
179
the entity that designed and manufactured the locomotive, and because of the
Napier and Kurns decisions, these manufacturers cannot be held liable for a

172. Southern Ry. Co. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398, 402 (1936).
173. See id. (“With reason, it cannot be said that Congress intended that every gadget placed upon a
locomotive by a carrier, for experimental purposes, should become part thereof within the rule of absolute
liability.”).
174. Id.
175. Infra Part IV.B.
176. Gilmore, 2012 WL 3205233, at *10 (motion for summary judgment denied).
177. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 188 (1949).
178. See McGarity, supra note 168 (lamenting that in one case, “the families of railroad employees who
contracted mesothelioma from defectively designed locomotive parts . . . will never get their day in court” under
restrictive laws).
179. See Woods v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. NC035695 (2d Dist. Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2008) (including
claims against the railroad for plaintiff’s injury due to handhold placement even though the locomotive was
designed and manufactured by a different company).
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180

design that the FRA approved as being appropriately safe for use. It is a
fundamental cornerstone of the American tort system that, generally, a person is
181
only liable for his or her own actions. Following this concept, it would be a
legal anomaly to hold the railroads liable for the actions and decisions of
182
manufacturers of locomotives and their parts.
In addition to holding railroads legally responsible for the actions of others,
allowing these design defect FELA lawsuits undermines the entire existence of
the LIA. As mentioned, the LIA was enacted in order to create uniform standards
183
of safety across the railroad industry. The FRA was created under the LIA to
impose safety standards and set a starting point for railroads around which to
184
base their maintenance practices. If each state and its courts were permitted to
hear design defect cases, and if each court could issue holdings that only bind the
state in which the court sits, the LIA regulations would become irrelevant. With
185
each defective design claim would come a “reasonable alternative design,”
where the plaintiff would offer his view of how the locomotive or part should
186
have been designed. If the jury finds for the plaintiff, the court is essentially
dictating what type of safety equipment and devices a railroad must use in order
to escape liability. Luckily, this has not yet occurred, as the vast majority of these
187
cases settle before trial in an attempt to avoid this uncertainty.
1. Prohibiting Defective Design Lawsuits Against Railroads
With strong arguments on both sides of the issue, the most logical solution is
to extend the field preemption to railroads. Although many railroads would argue
that the field preemption should not apply to manufacturers and should only
apply to railroads, this argument is not feasible for the same reason mentioned
above: doing so would invalidate the purpose of the LIA. Even though removing
the field preemption protection from the manufacturers would offer plaintiffs a
180. Kurns, v. R.R. Friction Prod. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1269–70 (2012).
181. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1964) (listing the elements of a negligence claim,
which are generally based on a defendant’s own actions).
182. Id.
183. Brief for Respondent at 4, Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prod. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012) (No. 10-879),
2011 WL 4590847.
184. Id.
185. In making a prima facie case of defective design, a plaintiff must offer a “reasonable alternative
design” to show that alternatives were feasible and would have prevented the harm that occurred.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: Products Liability § 2(b) (1998).
186. See, e.g., Woods v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. NC035695, slip op. at 2 (2d Dist. Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
15, 2008) (describing plaintiff’sargument that that hand-holds on side of railcar should have been horizontal,
instead of vertical, despite the fact that the FRA approved the design with horizontal hand-holds) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
187. Johnson Interiew, supra note 69; see, e.g., Gilmore v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. S–09–2180-KMJDAD, 2012 WL 3205233, at *10 (E.D. Aug. 2012) (case settled after defendant lost motion for summary
judgment but before trial).
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more appropriate party against whom to bring their claims, it would
impermissibly impinge on the power and effectiveness that Congress intended
the LIA to have. The Act must occupy the entire field of locomotive safety,
regardless of who the defendant is, so that railroads can continue to operate
efficiently on an interstate basis.
In light of these concerns, no plaintiff should be able to successfully bring a
defective design claim based on a locomotive or locomotive part that was
reviewed and approved by the FRA. Since the FRA approves all locomotives in
188
use by a railroad, an injured employee cannot bring a suit under the FELA and
the LIA alleging a defective design. A definitive statement from Congress
establishing that products liability suits against manufacturers or railroad carriers
are prohibited would eliminate the trend occurring in the industry. A ruling from
the US Supreme Court would accomplish the same goal, but it is unlikely that the
opportunity will present itself, as most of these cases do not even make it to trial,
189
much less to the Supreme Court.
The implications of removing defective design claims under the FELA would
not be as far reaching as most plaintiffs’ attorneys suggest. The only claims that
would be completely barred from being brought would be claims that rest solely
190
on a theory of defective design. Complaints that allege negligent maintenance
191
or an actual violation of the LIA would remain valid.
Since the Supreme Court has held that state lawmakers are not qualified to
substitute their judgment on safety for that of the federal government and its
192
experts, it follows that individual employees and their counsel are similarly
unqualified. FELA plaintiffs would not be losing anything or having their rights
infringed upon. In reality, setting this legal standard will not eliminate recovery
for most plaintiffs, as there would still be recovery for statutory violations for
193
unsafe modification to the locomotive.
2. Appeals to the FRA Directly
194

Typically a design defect claim is accompanied by negligence claims. In
the usual case, if the products liability claim is stripped away, the case can still

188. If an active locomotive was not approved by the FRA, that would constitute an LIA violation and
would be negligent per se. 49 U.S.C. § 20701 (2006). The plaintiff would have a prima facie case of negligence
necessary to satisfy the requirements of the FELA.
189. Johnson Interview, supra note 69.
190. See supra Part III.E (discussing the ways an employee bringing an injury claim against a railroad
could frame a case).
191. See supra Part II.B (discussing the legislative history of the LIA).
192. Id.
193. See supra Part II.B (discussing the legislative history of the LIA).
194. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. S–09–2180-KMJ-DAD, 2012 WL 3205233, at *1
(E.D. Aug. 2012) (including claims for general negligence, along with claims of defective design).
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proceed on the other stated causes of action. If a case does not have other
claims, usually the merits of the case are weak and the plaintiff does not meet the
196
qualifications for recovery.
In the rare case in which a plaintiff has a claim that alleges defective design
of a locomotive and there are no other means of recovery and no other claims
being alleged, and it would be inequitable to deny any recovery, Congress should
enact a system in which a plaintiff can file an appeal with the FRA directly. As
previously mentioned, it goes against basic legal principles to allow these
lawsuits against the railroads, but it would not violate these same principles to
bring a complaint to the FRA. Because the FRA is the governing body of railroad
safety, and it is the entity that approves the challenged design, deserving
plaintiffs should have a process in which they can challenge the design to the
board that determined it was safe for use.
The best way to allow for complaints directly to the FRA would be to
establish an administrative judicial board, much like the Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Board, where a plaintiff can appeal his award amount or denial of
197
workers’ compensation. Similarly, an appeals board for the FRA would hear
cases from plaintiffs who allege that a design was wrongfully approved and have
the power to award damages to compensate a deserving plaintiff. Additionally,
because deserving plaintiffs of this kind would be rare, the board may also hear
suggestions or challenges to FRA-issued regulations that may have had adverse
consequences. To ensure that the board is not biased, it should be staffed with
disinterested members who were not involved in the enactment of new
regulations or the approval of submitted designs, but who have some expertise in
the field of railroad engineering. A fresh eye and a motivated advocate may act
as a check on the FRA and make sure that it continues to consider all aspects of
safety when approving requested designs.
By having plaintiffs focus their grievances towards the FRA directly, the
purpose of the LIA will not be undermined, as a court of law will not be
determining what constitutes adequately safe locomotive parts. While it may be
doubtful that the FRA will be swayed to change its long-established safety
regulations, giving plaintiffs the chance to make their cases will maintain the
humanitarian and liberal goals of the FELA and the LIA.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the pressing need to interpret the FELA and the LIA liberally to
facilitate employee recovery, the case law makes it clear that courts are not

195. Johnson Interview, supra note 69.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Cal. Labor Code §§ 110–138.2 (West 2011) (the statutory scheme establishing the
existence of the California Worker’s Compensation Appeals Board).
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willing to stretch it so far so as to make the railroads a complete insurer of their
198
While employee protection is a strong interest,
employee’s wellbeing.
especially in light of the power the railroads command, ultimately, this interest
must be balanced against the need for national uniformity across the railroad
industry.
Since it was clearly not Congress’ intent to create legislation that would
serve no purpose and accomplish no goal, it is apparent that the Napier field
preemption must extend to the railroads. Failure to do so would render the
entirety of the LIA obsolete.
If plaintiffs were able to bring defective design claims against the railroad,
then each lawsuit would effectively question the FRA and federal government’s
ability to determine sufficient safety limits. Allowing each court to make the
determination as to what constitutes acceptable safety regulations would create
varied results and would put the country back where it was before the LIA was
enacted: railroad carriers having to abide by numerous sets of laws, depending on
199
which state a train is traveling through. If a railroad opted not to respect a state
court’s decision on what it considered to be acceptable safety equipment, it
would incur liability for any employee injured in that state, which would be a
200
huge risk for any carrier. Ultimately, allowing an employee plaintiff to sue his
railroad employer under the LIA alleging a defective design claim places liability
on the railroads that is both inequitable and contrary to the underlying principles
of the FELA, and should not be allowed.

198. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 188 (1949) (stating the purpose of the statute is to “facilitate[e]
employee recovery”). But see Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 171 (2007) (stating that the FELA
“does not. . . require[] us to interpret every uncertainty in the act in favor of the employees”). Courts have been
careful to avoid turning the FELA into a no-fault system of compensation and to maintain its intent as a tortbased system. Greendige, supra note 7, at 418.
199. See generally Napier v. Atl. Coast R. Co. et al., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) (offering examples of the
differing state regulations by which railroads had to attempt to abide by to avoid legal action).
200. See Napier, 272 U.S. at 607 (stating that the railroads filed the suit to enjoin state officials from
enforcing the laws and avoid raising their cost of business).
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